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STATE v. NELSON: DETERMINING
"REASONABLE SUSPICION" FOR
INVESTIGATORY STOPS IN MAINE
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law
Court, held in State v. Nelson' that a police officer's observation of
motorist Theodore Nelson consuming a single can of beer over a
one-hour time period did not, by itself, give rise to a reasonable sus-
picion2 that Nelson thereafter illegally operated the vehicle under
the influence of alcohol. The officer had watched Nelson, who was
parked in the parking lot of a housing complex from which several
complaints of theft had been registered, consume one sixteen-ounce
beer during the early morning of Christmas Eve.3 The officer ob-
served no indicia of physical impairment nor anything unusual in
Nelson's appearance nor any signs of erratic driving.4 The majority
focused on the shortcomings of the officer's observations. The dis-
sent, however, focused on a combination of objective facts. This ju-
dicial difference of opinion in State v. Nelson, concerning which
criteria should characterize reasonable suspicion, illustrates the Law
Court's struggle to maintain a consistent approach in resolving the
Fourth Amendment issue of unreasonable search and seizure in in-
vestigatory stops.
This Note analyzes the Law Court's decision in Nelson. It begins
in Part II by tracking the development of the "reasonable suspicion"
standard for constitutional investigatory stops. As established by
United States Supreme Court decision, the standard for a constitu-
tional stop is objective and incorporates the totality of the circum-
stances for determining reasonable suspicion. Part II goes on to
describe Maine's current approach to determining the constitution-
ality of investigatory stops. It focuses on the distinction between the
Supreme Court's objective standard and Maine's requirement that
stops meet both objective and subjective standards of reasonable
suspicion. In Part III this Note demonstrates the potential for the
1. 638 A.2d 720 (Me. 1994).
2. The concept of reasonable suspicion as grounds for a police stop was first
raised in 1940 by the promulgation of the Uniform Arrest Act, section 2(1) of which
states that "[a] peace officer may stop any person abroad who he has reasonable
ground to suspect is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime.... ."
Richard M. Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. CRiM. L.,
CRUMNOLOGY & PoLicE Sci. 393 n.4 (1963) (citing Sam B. Warner, The Uniform
Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 343-47 (1942)).
3. Id at 723 (Collins, J., dissenting). The dissent drew certain inferences by view-
ing these established facts in combination with the common practice in American
society of having a second beer.
4. State v. Nelson, 638 A.2d at 722.
[Vol. 47:225
INVESTIGATORY STOPS
Law Court to confuse its subjective and objective tests for suspicion
and explains how Nelson illustrates this confusion of standards. Part
IV compares Maine's approach to determining reasonable suspicion
with that of the United States Supreme Court and points out how
the Law Court's analysis in Nelson strays from both prior Law Court
decisions and United States Supreme Court doctrine. In its analysis,
this Note compares Nelson to several other Maine opinions and rec-
ommends that, if the Maine Law Court is to continue to adhere to
both objective and subjective standards in its determination of rea-
sonable suspicion, it must take care to apply the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" doctrine appropriately.
H. THE "REASONABLE SUSPICION" STANDARD FOR THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN INVESTIGATORY STOP
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated .... ."I Nevertheless, "stop and frisk,"
which consists of an officer's stopping, questioning, and even per-
haps searching a suspicious person, was standard practice for gener-
ations without constitutional challenge. In 1914, however, the
United States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States6 provided
the first check on this police procedure. In Weeks the Court ex-
cluded from a federal prosecution evidence that had been seized in a
"stop and frisk" search the Court held to be unconstitutional under
the Fourth Amendment.7 Thirty-five years later, in 1949, the Court
in Wolf v. Colorado' addressed under the Due Process Clause of the
5. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has stated that:
The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to
impose a standard of "reasonableness" upon the exercise of discretion by
government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order" 'to safe-
guard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions
....'" Thus, the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Imple-
mented in this manner, the reasonableness standard usually requires, at a
minimum, that the facts upon which an intrusion is based be capable of
measurement against "an objective standard"....
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (citations omitted).
6. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
7. Id. at 391-92. The Court specifically stated:
The Fourth Amendment... put the courts of the United States and Fed-
eral officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations
and restraints [and] ... forever secure[d] the people, their persons, houses,
papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the
guise of law.., and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory
upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the
laws.
8. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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Fourteenth Amendment the issue of limitations on investigatory
stops in state prosecutions. The Court stated that a state sanction of
police incursion into privacy "would run counter to the guaranty of
the Fourth Amendment."' Nevertheless, the Court decided that the
Weeks exclusionary rule, applicable as against the federal govern-
ment, would not be imposed upon the states as a requirement of due
process. 10 In 1961, however, in Mapp v. Ohio," the Court reversed
its decision in Wolf. Mapp established that all evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment standard for reasonable
searches and seizures is inadmissible in a state court. 2
A. The Terry-Stop
Under the Mapp requirement that evidence gathered in an uncon-
stitutional police stop must be excluded from state prosecution, the
Supreme Court in 1968 decided Terry v. Ohio. 3 In Terry the Court
addressed the narrow question of whether it is constitutional for a
police officer to seize a person and subject him to a limited search
for weapons where the officer has no probable cause for an arrest. 4
In balancing the constitutional protection of the right to privacy with
9. Id. at 28.
10. Id. at 27-29. The Court stated that "the contrariety of views of the States [on
the adoption of the exclusionary rule of Weeks was] particularly impressive" and
that it could not "brush aside the experience of States which deem the incidence of
such conduct by the police too slight to call for a deterrent remedy.., by overriding
the [States'] relevant rules of evidence." Id. at 29-32.
11. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12. Id. In reviewing Wolf s holding that all evidence obtained by an unconstitu-
tional search and seizure was inadmissible in a federal court regardless of its source,
the Mapp Court stated that it was "led by [Wol] to close the only courtroom door
remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness . . . ." Id. at 654-55.
13. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry v. Ohio, the police officer seized a revolver from
the defendant after observing the defendant and one other man each pace back and
forth in front of a store window, peer into the window, and then confer on the street
corner. "The two men repeated this ritual alternately between five and six times
apiece-in all roughly a dozen trips," leading the officer to conclude they were con-
templating a robbery. Id at 6. The officer stopped and frisked the defendant,
thereby securing the revolver that the prosecution introduced into evidence at the
defendant's trial. Id. at 6-7.
14. Professor LaFave, in his treatise on search and seizure, discusses the probable
cause standard for arrest by stating, "For arrest, the traditional formula is that the
officer must have reasonable grounds to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the person to be arrested has committed it... it must appear more prob-
able than not that criminal conduct has occured." WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 3 SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 9.3(b), at 431-32 (2d. ed. 1987). Professor LaFave explains the rea-
sonable suspicion standard for investigatory stops as follows:
[Flor a brief stop, it is said to suffice that the officer "reasonably suspects"
criminal activity, or, as was put in Terry, that the officer reasonably believes
"that criminal activity may be afoot;" ... [I]t will suffice that there exists a
substantial possibility that criminal conduct has occurred, is occurring, or is
about to occur.
Id. (citation omitted).
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the needs of law enforcement, the Terry Court considered the na-
ture and extent of the governmental interests involved. The Court
noted that the government's interest in crime prevention and detec-
tion "underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropri-
ate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person
for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though
there is no probable cause to make an arrest."'" Validating an in-
vestigatory stop under just such circumstances in Terry, the Court
held:
[In justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must
be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion. The scheme of the Fourth Amendment
becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point
the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be
subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge
who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or
seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making
that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against
an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer
at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief" that the action taken was
appropriate?16
To satisfy the Constitution an officer making a stop thus must be
able to point to "specific and articulable facts" supporting a "rea-
sonable suspicion" that criminal activity may be afoot. This reason-
able suspicion standard for Constitutional investigatory stops
requires less justification than does the probable cause standard for
arrest. 7 Several Circuit Courts of Appeal opinions hold that, in or-
der for an officer to meet the reasonable suspicion requirement, the
officer is not required to rule out the possibility of innocent behav-
ior before making a stop.'8 In fact, an officer may be neglecting her
duties by not making the stop.' 9 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit has
noted:
The test [for a constitutional stop] is founded suspicion ....
Even if it was equally probable that the vehicle or its occu-
pants were innocent of any wrongdoing, police officers must
15. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 22.
16. Id. at 21 (citations omitted).
17. LAFAvE, supra note 14.
18. See United States v. TIrullo, 809 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1987) (reasonable suspicion
though circumstances capable of innocent interpretation); United States v. Ogden,
703 F.2d 629, 633 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding there were grounds for a stop, the court
declared, "[U]nder these facts, the officers would have been derelict in their duty if
they had not stopped the trucks for investigation.").
19. United States v. Ogden, 703 F.2d at 633.
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be permitted to act before their reasonable belief is verified b
escape or ftuition of the harm it was their duty to prevent.2°
B. The United States Supreme Court Doctrine of
Totality of the Circumstances
Although the Terry Court undeniably acknowledged the propriety
of an investigatory stop based on something less than the "probable
cause" necessary for arrests, no single shorthand formula adequately
expresses the constitutional grounds for a Terry stop.21 It has been
clearly established, however, that the Supreme Court's objective test
for reasonable suspicion requires a view of all the circumstances sur-
rounding the stop. As the Court in United States v. Cortez'2 noted:
Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive con-
cept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a
person. Terms like "articulable reasons" and "founded suspi-
cion" are not self-defining; they fall short of providing clear
guidance dispositive of the myriad factual situations that arise.
But the essence of all that has been written is that the totality
of the circumstances-the whole picture-must be taken into
account. Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers
must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting
the particular person stopped of criminal activityP3
The Supreme Court discussed the doctrine of totality of the cir-
cumstances at length in Cortez,24 noting:
[T]he assessment [of the whole picture] must be based upon
all of the circumstances. The analysis proceeds with various
objective observations... and consideration of the modes or
patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From
these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes de-
ductions-inferences and deductions that might well elude an
untrained person.25
20. United States v. Holland, 510 F.2d 453,455 (9th Cir. 1975) (citation omitted).
21. LAFAvE, supra note 14, § 9.3(a).
22. 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (holding that objective facts and circumstantial evidence
justified an investigative stop by Border Patrol agents of a vehicle subsequently
found to contain several illegal aliens).
23. I. at 417-18 (citations omitted). In a decision prior to the Supreme Court's
elaboration on the doctrine of totality of the circumstances in United States v. Cor-
tez, Justice Powell noted: "Terry v. Ohio establishes that a reasonable investigatory
stop does not offend the Fourth Amendment. The reasonableness of a stop turns on
the facts and circumstances of each case." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 561 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring). Similarly, the Court has stated that the
Fourth Amendment requires some minimal level of objective justification in making
the stop, in view of the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer. United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
24. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
25. Id at 418.
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The Cortez Court went on to say that "the evidence thus collected
must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by schol-
ars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforce-
ment."'26 In other words, in addition to the officer's consideration of
the surrounding circumstances in forming reasonable suspicion, the
court must view the totality of the circumstances in its review of the
officer's actions, and it is not acceptable for the court to determine
the reasonableness of an officer's suspicion based on how the court
would react in similar circumstances. Rather, in deciding the objec-
tive reasonableness of the officer's suspicion, the court must con-
sider all the circumstances, taking into consideration the inferences
and deductions likely to be made by a trained officer.
C. The Terry-Stop in Maine
Although the Fourth Amendment technically has no direct impact
on the states,27 the Maine Law Court typically cites to the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution as authority for its
decisions in the area of investigatory stops.28 In doing so the Law
Court relies upon the Supreme Court's 1949 decision in Wolf v. Col-
26. Id
27. The Fourth Amendment has been held to limit only the federal government.
not the states; however, the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 began a
process that ultimately would give citizens rights as against the states effectively the
same as those they enjoy against the federal government. Historian Leonard W.
Levy noted:
[Historically] there was a double standard in the United States. The first
eight amendments enjoined the national government to respect enumer-
ated procedures and to refrain from enacting certain laws, but left the
states free to do as they wished in relation to the same matters.... The
point of [Justice] Black's [dissent in Adarnson v. California] was that the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment transformed that situation by
embracing the Bill of Rights, thereby nationalizing its operation: what the
United States could not do, the individual states could not do.
LEONARD W. LEVY, JUDGMENTs-EsSAYs ON AmRICAN CONsTrTmr NAL His.
TORY 67-68 (1972) (citing Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947)). Justice
Black's dissenting position in Adamson, advocating total incorporation of the Bill of
Rights into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, was never ac-
cepted by the Supreme Court; by the 1960s, however, the Court had begun to rely
on "selective incorporation." IL at 76.
Under selective incorporation, a right held to be fundamental is incorporated into
due process as the full right guaranteed by the matching provision in the Bill of
Rights. The guarantee of a fundamental right as against the states, under Four-
teenth Amendment due process, therefore becomes coextensive with the guarantees
of the Bill of Rights against the federal government. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
649-55 (1961), the Supreme Court held that freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure is a fundamental right, thereby under the doctrine of selective incorporation
making it applicable against the states under the same legal standards as those im-
posed on the federal government by the Fourth Amendment.
28. See, eg., State v. Fitzgerald, 620 A.2d 874,875 (Me. 1993); State v. Hatch, 614
A.2d 1299, 1301 (Me. 1992); State v. Burnham, 610 A.2d 733, 734 (Me. 1992).
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orado, in which the Court noted, "[T]he security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore im-
plicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause.",29
The Maine Law Court first applied the Unites States Supreme
Court's objective Terry standard for reasonable suspicion in police
stop cases in 1976 in State v. Babcock."0 In Babcock a police officer
made an investigatory stop of the defendant's automobile based on
the description of a crime-implicated vehicle, the automobile's loca-
tion, and the defendant's suspicious behavior. The defendant ap-
pealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence
obtained in the stop, and the Law Court held that "[t]here are many
situations in which an automobile may be stopped by police officers
even though 'probable cause,' either for arrest or for a search, does
not exist.3 ' Of course, in every event the stop must be reason-
able."' 2 After noting that the Terry holding "has now been ex-
tended to include investigatory stops of automobiles,"3 " the Law
Court discussed the underlying rationale of Terry:
Terry applied a balancing test to justify the officer's conduct,
weighing the harm of the invasion of individual privacy against
the government's interest in effective crime prevention and
detection. The officer's conduct in that case, the Court said,
was based on something more than "inarticulate hunches" and
"good faith," and outweighed the annoyance and humiliation
resulting from the "stop and frisk."'34
For a period of time after Babcock the Law Court continued to
rely on the objective Terry "reasonableness" standard in addressing
29. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). See supra text accompanying
note 8.
30. 361 A.2d 911 (Me. 1976).
31. Meeting the reasonable suspicion standard for investigatory stops, as defined
by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and adopted by the Maine
Law Court in State v. Babcock, 361 A.2d 911 (Me. 1976), requires a lesser measure
of evidence than does meeting the traditional probable cause standard for arrest.
Intrusion into privacy by means of an investigatory stop, as opposed to an arrest, is
justified if an officer has suspicion of "criminal conduct which has taken place, is
occurring, or imminently will occur." State v. Fitzgerald, 620 A.2d 874, 875 (Me.
1993). The observed conduct giving rise to an officer's suspicion that criminal activ-
ity is imminent may be entirely lawful in itself. Id. at 875 (citing State v. Griffin, 459
A.2d 1086, 1088 (Me. 1983)). In light of this assertion by the Law Court in Fitzger-
aid, the Nelson majority's observation that "[t]he consumption of liquor in a motor
vehicle by an adult while not operating the vehicle on a public way is neither a crime
nor a civil violation" is irrelevant. State v. Nelson, 638 A.2d 720, 722 (Me. 1994).
32. State v. Babcock, 361 A.2d at 914.
33. d. (citing United States v. Collins, 532 F.2d 79 (8th Cir. 1976)).
34. Id. at 914 (citation omitted).
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the constitutionality of police stops. In State v. Darling35 the court
applied the objective test of Terry and held:
The officer had specific and "articulable" facts giving rise to a
reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal
activity .... In such circumstances, the police officers had
reasonable grounds to suspect that defendant might have been
engaged in illegal night hunting... and their initial intrusion
was not constitutionally invalid.36
The Law Court's adherence to the objective Terry standard for rea-
sonable suspicion was reiterated in State v. Griffin,37 a case in which
the officer conducted an investigatory stop based on the defendant's
furtive behavior.38 The Griffin court held:
[T]he standard to be used to assess the constitutional suffi-
ciency of the factual basis underlying a Terry-type temporary
stop or detention of an individual must be an objective one:
would the facts available to the officer at the time of the stop
or detention, when viewed in their totality, "warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief" that the existing specific and
articulable facts do give rise to a reasonable suspicion of crimi-
nal activity and that an investigatory temporary stop or deten-
tion of the individual is appropriate to clear up the
suspicion?39
Although similar to the Supreme Court's language in Terry v.
Ohio,40 the Law Court's language in Griffin included the phrase
"when viewed in their totality," which mirrored the standard the
Supreme Court established in United States v. Cortez.4 1 In this ref-
erence to the totality of the circumstances, the Law Court in Griffin
did not refer specifically to the language of Cortez. Nevertheless,
the totality of the circumstances doctrine thereafter became an ele-
ment in the determination of objective reasonable suspicion in in-
vestigatory stops in Maine.42
35. 393 A.2d 530 (Me. 1978). In State v. Darling, the defendant was indicted on
two counts of criminal mischief with a firearm. Id. at 531. Prior to stopping the
defendant, the investigating officer was aware of a warden's earlier report of sounds
of shots in the area where the defendant was found. The officer discovered the de-
fendant's car with its headlights on by the side of a country road and subsequently
made an investigatory stop of the defendant.
36. Id. at 532 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
37. 459 A.2d 1086 (Me. 1983).
38. In Griffin the defendant slid from the driver's seat to the rear seat of his
parked car immediately upon realizing he was being observed by a law enforcement
officer. Id. at 1088.
39. Id at 1089 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21-22).
40. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
41. 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
42. The Law Court first applied the totality of the circumstances standard of
United States v. Cortez in State v. McKenzie, 440 A.2d 1072,1076 (Me. 1982). Later,
in State v. Fillion, 474 A.2d 187, 189 (Me. 1984), the Law Court noted that the stan-
dard cited by the Griffin court "requires that based upon the 'totality of the circum-
1995]
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D. Maine's Subjective Requirement for Reasonable Suspicion
Although the Law Court after Griffin continued to follow the
Supreme Court in investigatory stop cases by requiring evaluation of
the objective criteria of reasonable suspicion under the totality of
the circumstances,4 3 the Law Court's holding in State v. Chapman"
added a second test, a subjective test, to the standard for reasonable
suspicion. In Chapman, the officer parked immediately behind the
defendant's truck, blocking its movement, for no reason other than
to glance into the truck bed. The defendant had not committed any
motor vehicle infractions of which the officer was aware, and the
officer admitted that he "had no reason to stop it. It just struck [his]
suspicion why it was parked there."45
The trial court in Chapman found that these circumstances could
raise "the question in a reasonable man's mind or a reasonable of-
ficer's mind that there may have been a break, under all the circum-
stances, into those stores ... "'I46 The Law Court ruled on appeal,
however, that without a finding that the officer himself actually had
held such a suspicion, the ruling that the stop was objectively rea-
sonable was irrelevant. 7 Chapman held that "the court clearly must
find that the police actually had such a suspicion at the time of the
investigatory stop. A finding that a reasonable person could have
had a reasonable suspicion on the given facts is not alone sufficient.
,"48
The Law Court's decision in Chapman established that, in Maine,
both a subjective standard and an objective standard will be applied
in assessing an officer's "reasonable suspicion" for a police stop.
The absence of the officer's subjective suspicion, as in Chapman,
stances,' the detaining officer must 'have a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.'" Id. (quoting State v.
McKenzie, 440 A.2d 1072, 1076 (Me. 1982) (emphasis added) and United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)). See also, State v. Fortin, 632 A.2d 437, 438
(Me. 1993); State v. Dulac, 600 A.2d 1121, 1122 (Me. 1992); State v. Kneeland, 552
A.2d 4, 7 (Me. 1988); State v. Jarrett, 536 A.2d 1111, 1112 (Me. 1988).
43. See, eg., State v. Fillion, 474 A.2d at 189; State v. Thurlow, 485 A.2d 960, 963
(Me. 1984) ("For such an investigatory stop without a warrant to be 'reasonable'
under controlling constitutional mandates [the police] need have only an articulable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.").
44. 495 A.2d 314 (Me. 1985).
45. ld. at 315 n.1.
46. Id. at 316. The trial court in Chapman held that, because the defendant was
spotted behind a shopping mall after dark, the officer reasonably could have sus-
pected that the defendant was attempting to rob the mall stores. Id.
47. lId at 317. Express analysis of this subjective requirement does not surface in
all of the Law Court's decisions. This discrepancy, however, does not reflect incon-
sistencies in Maine's approach; rather, while the Law Court applies a subjective stan-
dard in all investigatory stop cases, an articulation of this standard factors into the
court's discussion only in those cases where there is a question as to whether the
subjective test has been met.
48. Id
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will result in a stop being invalidated. On the other hand, the ab-
sence of objective reasonableness, as in Nelson, also results in an
invalid stop. Maine appears to be the only state that requires both
an objective and a subjective component of reasonable suspicion.4 9
H. STATE V. NELSON
A. The Nelson Decision
In State v. Nelson 0 an investigating officer observed an unoccu-
pied automobile in a well lit parking lot of a housing complex at
approximately 1:30 A.M. on Christmas Eve. On account of recent
reports of theft, the officer took up an observation post approxi-
mately fifty to 100 yards from the automobile. He observed a
pickup truck with a driver, Nelson, and one passenger enter the
parking lot. After Nelson parked the pickup truck next to the unoc-
cupied vehicle, he and the passenger each began drinking a sixteen-
49. LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 9.3(a) at 425. While Professor LaFave cited both
Maine and California as applying a subjective standard, California since has rejected
such a test. People v. Sherman, 24 Cal. App. 4th 1309 (1993). Professor LaFave also
notes that the "reasonable suspicion" test, as applied by the Supreme Court, "as is
the case with the legal standard for arrest, is purely objective and thus there is no
requirement that an actual suspicion by the officer be shown." LAFAvE, supra note
14, § 9.3(a), at 425 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected a
subjective inquiry; rather, the Court has emphasized the need for a purely objective
test to determine the reasonableness of an officer's suspicion. In Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-38 (1978), the Supreme Court stated:
[I]n evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment the Court has
first undertaken an objective assessment of an officer's actions in light of
the facts and circumstances then known to him.... [T]he fact that the
officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the rea-
sons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not
invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively,
justify that action.
Arguably, the rationale for not requiring a subjective standard revolves around the
belief (or hope) that, prior to making an investigatory stop, an officer necessarily
and logically would have some kind of suspicion. Another possible rationale is that
requiring a subjective state of mind would be too troublesome for courts.
[A] test that requires courts to analyze an officer's subjective intent logi-
cally would require an examination of the officer in court and evaluation of
any other evidence that would tend to show the officer's state of mind at
the time in question. That requirement alone would make the subjective
test burdensome even if courts could determine the actual subjective intent
of officers.
Andrew J. Pulliam, Note, Developing a Meaningful Fourth Amendment Approach to
Automobile Investigatory Stops, 47 VArD. L REv. 477, 519 (1994). Even if an of-
ficer did not in actuality harbor any suspicion at the time of the stop, it would be
easy to fabricate that suspicion at trial, and thus a suspicion inquiry seems meaning-
less. Id. (citing Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MiNN. L. Rnv. 349,436-37 (1974)) ("Professor Amsterdam has indicated that police
officers easily and undetectably can fabricate a legitimate subjective purpose to do
something that is objectively lawful.").
50. 638 A.2d 720 (Me. 1994).
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ounce can of beer. After approximately forty-five to fifty minutes,
the passenger exited the truck, and Nelson drove out of the parking
complex." When Nelson's pickup reached the officer's observation
site, the officer immediately made an enforcement stop of the
pickup. Although he observed nothing unusual about the operation
of the pickup or any evidence of mechanical defects or excessive
speed, the officer stopped the pickup because, as he said, "[I] ob-
served the operator... drinkin' a can of beer... [and suspected
that] the person may be under the influence of intoxicating
liquor.
52
Nelson subsequently was charged with operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.5 3 Nelson filed a
motion to suppress the evidence' secured as a result of the stop; the
district court denied the motion, holding that the officer "had rea-
sonable articulable suspicion to stop the Defendant's vehicle." 55
Upon conviction by the superior court, 6 Nelson appealed to the
Law Court on the ground that the district court erred in not granting
his motion to suppress the evidence secured as a result of the stop.
Specifically, Nelson contended that "the totality of the circum-
stances related by [Officer] Holmes did not give rise to an objec-
tively reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal conduct and,
accordingly, the stop was not justified.- 57
The Law Court vacated the judgment and remanded to the supe-
rior court, holding that "[b]ased on the whole picture presented by
this case, it cannot be said that it was objectively reasonable to be-
lieve that 'criminal activity was afoot.' "58 Accordingly, the Law
51. Id. at 721.
52. Id at 721-22.
53. The statute under which Nelson was charged provides, "A person is guilty of
a criminal violation under this section if he operates or attempts to operate a motor
vehicle: A. While under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs or a combina-
tion of liquor and drugs .... " ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312-B(1) (West Supp.
1994-1995).
54. Each of the Maine decisions cited in this Note adjudicated a motion to sup-
press evidence secured as a result of an unlawful stop. As noted by the Supreme
Court:
[E]videntiary rulings provide the context in which the judicial process of
inclusion and exclusion approves some conduct as comporting with consti-
tutional guarantees and disapproves other actions by state agents. A ruling
admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary ef-
fect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
55. State v. Nelson, 638 A.2d at 722.
56. Judgment subsequently was entered against Nelson by the Penobscot County
Superior Court in accordance with a jury verdict finding him guilty of operating a
motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Id. at 721.
57. Id. at 722.
58. Id (citing State v. Griffin, 459 A.2d 1086 (Me. 1983)).
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Court held that the district court should have granted Nelson's mo-
tion to suppress the evidence secured as a result of the claimed ie-
gal stop. Citing both United States Supreme Court and Maine Law
Court cases,5 9 the court found, as a matter of law, what it held to be
a clear deficiency in the evidence supporting the objective reasona-
bleness of the suspicion that prompted the officer to stop Nelson.'
The Law Court found in Nelson that, "based on the whole pic-
ture,' it was not "objectively reasonable to believe that criminal
activity was afoot in this case."'
B. Maine's Dual Subjective and Objective Standards for
Reasonable Suspicion Are Problematic in Nelson
The central difficulty in reconciling Nelson with Supreme Court
decisions and with other Maine Law Court decisions arises from
Maine's objective-subjective approach to the reasonable suspicion
inquiry in investigatory stop cases. In order to determine that the
Nelson investigating officer demonstrated actual suspicion (the sub-
jective test), the Law Court appropriately focused on the officer's
stated reasons for his suspicion. However, in deciding the objective
reasonableness of the officer's suspicion, the Law Court mistakenly
confined itself to only those facts offered by the officer to establish
his own suspicion. The Court failed to take into account, as re-
quired by both Cortez and Griffin, the totality of the circumstances.
C. Misuse of Officer's Testimony is a Source of Confusion
In State v. Camevale63 the Law Court stated that "[t]he officer's
subjective suspicion of ongoing criminal activity may be established
either by the direct testimony of the officer or by circumstantial evi-
dence. . . ."I If, as in Carnevale, the officer does not testify specifi-
cally as to what he suspected, yet the court infers from the
circumstances that the officer did in fact entertain actual suspicion
of criminal activity, the court logically will have found not only sub-
jective suspicion but also that the officer's suspicion was objectively
reasonable. In other words, if the court reasons from the circum-
stances, rather than from an officer's testimony, and finds that the
59. Al.
60. In support of the Nelson decision Justice Glassman noted:
The record reveals that the officer observed nothing to support his suspi-
cion that Nelson was operating under the influence of alcohol other than
Nelson's consumption of a single can of beer over the course of nearly one
hour.... The officer offered no reason for his stop of the motor vehicle
other than his suspicion that Nelson was under the influence of alcohol.
Id.
61. Id.
62. Id-
63. 598 A.2d 746 (Me. 1991).
64. Id. at 748 (emphasis added).
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officer had actual suspicion, the court also has found that it was ob-
jectively reasonable for the officer, when faced with those particular
circumstances, to have suspicion of criminal activity. In cases such
as these, where the court relies not on an officer's direct testimony
but on surrounding circumstances to determine his actual suspicion,
the court necessarily must have considered more than the limits of
the officer's awareness.
However, in cases like Nelson, where the officer does testify di-
rectly that he had an actual suspicion of criminal activity, the court is
not forced necessarily to look at all circumstances in order to deter-
mine subjective suspicion. In such a case the court must be wary, in
determining objectively reasonable suspicion, not to rely only on
those circumstances the officer specifically offers as his subjective
reasons for the stop. This approach becomes problematic when the
officer, in testifying to his actual suspicion, does not invoke every
circumstance of the stop. A court's reliance on only those limited
circumstances testified to by the officer as grounds for his actual sus-
picion would violate the Law Court's requirement that an officer's
suspicion of criminal activity must be objectively reasonable under
the totality of the circumstances.65
A law enforcement officer often relies on his full experience in
the field when formulating inferences of suspicion. He does not al-
ways specifically testify to all of his inferences at trial, however.6 6
"[T]here are limits, of course, on what may be expected from the
police in terms of verbalizing their observations and impressions
967
The potential for losing the totality of the circumstances in the
confusion of Maine's two separate tests for reasonable suspicion was
realized in the Nelson decision. Once Officer Holmes established
subjective suspicion by testifying directly that he actually did suspect
Nelson of operating under the influence of alcohol, the Law Court
65. See State v. Fortin, 632 A.2d 437,438 (Me. 1993) ("The court must look to the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop.") (citing State v. Thurlow, 485
A.2d 960, 963 (Me. 1984)); State v. Jarrett, 536 A.2d 1111, 1112 (Me. 1988) ("In
determining whether a reasonable suspicion existed, a court must take into account
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop.") (citing United States v. Cor-
tez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). But see State v. Garland, 482 A.2d 139, 145 (Me.
1984) ("[W]e cannot relieve an officer of the duty to actually testify respecting the
basis for, and the nature of, his suspicions. To do otherwise would impute to the
officer a suspicion of criminal activity that perhaps he never entertained ....").
66. In addition to drawing inferences based on their training and experience, of-
ficers are permitted to make common-sense deductions. The Court in United States
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981), noted that an assessment of the whole picture
"does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of
probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-
sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do
the same-and so are law enforcement officers."
67. LAFAvE, supra note 14, § 9.3(a), at 428.
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should have shifted its inquiry to the objective test to determine
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer's suspi-
cion was reasonable. In seeking to determine the objective reasona-
bleness of Officer Holmes's suspicion, however, the Nelson court
focused solely on the observations attested to by the officer as
grounds for forming his own suspicion. The court failed to consider
all the surrounding circumstances in establishing whether that suspi-
cion was objectively reasonable.68
While an officer's stated observations will be one factor the court
must consider in evaluating the reasonableness of the officer's suspi-
cion, the rationale given by the officer for her actual, suspicion alone
cannot determine the objective reasonableness of her suspicion.69
The Maine Law Court in Nelson, having found that Officer Holmes
actually did entertain a suspicion of criminal activity, should have
gone on to examine the totality of the circumstances in evaluating
the objective reasonableness of that suspicion.
In vacating the superior court's judgment, the Nelson court relied
upon the insufficiency of objective reasonableness in Officer
Holmes's suspicion. Because the investigating officer testified that
he did in fact have a suspicion that Nelson might be under the influ-
ence of alcohol, the court's subjective test was met. The constitu-
tionality of the stop turned on the objective reasonableness of the
officer's suspicion, but the court's analysis of the stop's objective
reasonableness failed in two respects.
First, although the majority purported to consider the "whole pic-
ture,"7 it failed to acknowledge important objective facts, as Justice
68. In his dissenting opinion Justice Collins noted:
The stop in this instance was not based on mere speculation that Nelson
was driving while under the influence. Rather, the officer had observed
Nelson drinking a 16 ounce beer, at 1:30 in the morning on Christmas Eve,
while parked in the parking lot of a housing complex for the elderly from
which several complaints of theft had been registered.
State v. Nelson, 638 A.2d 720, 723 (Me. 1994) (Collins, J., dissenting).
69. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981) ("The analysis proceeds
with various objective observations... and consideration of the modes or patterns
of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers.") (emphasis added). The Cortez Court
here implies that the officer's observations alone do not justify the suspicion; rather,
from these observations and the officer's training and knowledge of the various cir-
cumstances accompanying certain crimes, the officer makes inferences and
deductions.
In Nelson, Officer Holmes observed Nelson drink a sixteen-ounce can of beer.
Although Officer Holmes did not testify specifically as to his knowledge of the typi-
cal circumstances surrounding the crime of driving while under the influence of alco-
hol, his training and experience necessarily would be expected to lead him to
consider the time and date in the totality of circumstances surrounding his decision
to make the investigatory stop of Nelson.
70. State v. Nelson, 638 A.2d at 722. It is interesting to note the Law Court's
statement that "[t]he consumption of liquor in a motor vehicle by an adult while not
operating the vehicle on a public way is neither a crime nor a civil violation." Il In
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Collins's dissenting opinion reveals.7 ' In particular, Justice Collins
notes the date, Christmas Eve, and the time, 1:30 A.M., as two crucial
factors overlooked by the majority. The Law Court's failure to con-
sider these surrounding circumstances not only deviates from the
Supreme Court's holding in Cortez but also runs contrary to prior
Law Court decisions.72
Second, in its analysis of surrounding circumstances the Law
Court did not account for the inferences and deductions concerning
these additional circumstances that necessarily would have been
made by an investigating officer trained in the field of law enforce-
ment. While the investigating officer in Nelson did not testify that
the time and date factored into his own suspicion of Nelson, he did
include time and date in his testimony. The court should have con-
sidered these circumstances and a trained officer's reaction to them
in its consideration of the reasonableness of the officer's decision to
stop Nelson.
IV. INCONSISTENT MAINE DECISIONS STRAY FROM THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD FOR REASONABLE
SUSPICION
The Law Court in Nelson, in its "totality of the circumstances"
assessment of the reasonableness of Officer Holmes's suspicion,
gave insufficient weight not only to the time and date of the stop but
also to the reaction a trained officer would have to such factors. The
lack of recognition of an officer's experience strays from the
Supreme Court's Terry and Cortez holdings, which stressed that the
objective legal standard for reasonable stops requires viewing the
circumstances through the eyes of a trained officer.73 The Law
Court's failure to recognize the date and time of night in its objec-
tive test for reasonable suspicion strays not only from the Supreme
Court's standard but from the Law Court's own totality of the cir-
cumstances doctrine as well.
State v. Richford; 519 A.2d 193 (Me. 1986), the court held that the stop of an appar-
ently intoxicated defendant seated in the driver's seat of a parked car was lawful.
Although the defendant argued that he was not in the process of attempting or con-
spiring to commit a crime, the court responded that there "is no requirement that
the reasonable suspicion be that the defendant is in the act of committing a crime. It
is enough if the police officer could reasonably suspect him of intending the immi-
nent commission of a crime." Id. at 195 (citing State v. Garland, 482 A.2d at 139,
145 (Me. 1984)).
71. State v. Nelson, 638 A.2d at 723 (Collins, J., dissenting).
72. See State v. Dean, 645 A.2d 634 (Me. 1994); State v. Hatch, 614 A.2d 1299
(Me. 1992); State v. Burnham, 610 A.2d 733 (Me. 1992).
73. "[I]n determining whether the officer acted reasonably... due weight must
be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of
his experience." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 1, 27 (1968).
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A. The Nelson Decision Illustrates the Law Court's Inconsistent
Application of the Totality of Circumstances Doctrine
A review of six recent Law Court decisions highlights the court's
inconsistent application of the totality of the circumstances doctrine
in the determination of reasonable suspicion in investigatory stop
cases. In three of these cases, the court explicitly refers to the total-
ity of the circumstances determining the reasonableness of an of-
ficer's suspicion as including the time of night. In the other three
decisions, the court appears to ignore the element of time in the
objective totality of the circumstances.
In State v. Dean,74 as in Nelson, the defendant, whose driving was
otherwise unremarkable, parked late one night in an area where re-
cent complaints of vandalism7 had been reported. Although the
facts differ slightly from Nelson in that the defendant was parked in
an uninhabited housing development as opposed to the parking lot
of a housing complex for the elderly, the court noted that "[the of-
ficer's] suspicion of Dean was engendered by prior complaints [of
vandalism] combined with other facts-the time of night and the ab-
sence of any apparent reason to be in an uninhabited housing
development., 7 6
In State v. Burnham7' an officer stopped the defendant at 12:45
A.M. after seeing the defendant's car weave back and forth between
the center line and the line marking the breakdown lane about six
times. The car never actually crossed either line. Defendant was
traveling between thirty-five and forty miles per hour even though
the posted speed limit was fifty miles per hour. The Law Court
stated that on the basis of all of these factors, including the lateness
of the hour, "it was not clear error for the [trial] court to conclude
that the officer was justified in stopping [the defendant]." 78
In State v. Hatch79 an officer observed the defendant and a female
companion in the early morning hours parked next to a local lounge.
The officer then followed the defendant, who "had a fixed stare and
messy hair""0 as he drove two or three miles to a Dunkin Donuts
Shop. The officer arrested the defendant after observing his inabil-
ity to maintain his balance while trying to enter the donut shop."
Several more factors of circumstance appear in Hatch than in Nel-
son, but the court acknowledged that "ft]he cumulative effect of
74. 645 A.2d 634 (Me. 1994).
75. In Nelson, recent complaints of burglaries had been reported.
76. State v. Dean, 645 A.2d at 637 (emphasis added). Dean's arrest occurred at
11:00 P.M.
77. 610 A.2d 733 (Me. 1992).
78. Id. at 734-35 (citing State v. Mehuren, 594 A.2d 1073, 1075 (Me. 1991); State
v. Pinkham, 565 A.2d 318, 319-20 (Me. 1989)).
79. 614 A.2d 1299 (Me. 1992).
80. Id. at 1301.
81. Id
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these observations,"' including "the defendant's late night park-
ing,"83 reasonably warranted the officer's suspicion.
Although the Law Court did consider time of night in the preced-
ing three cases, in two other Maine decisions the court appeared to
ignore, as it did in Nelson, this factor of the circumstances. In State
v. Caron,' even though the defendant was stopped in the early
morning hours, the court nonetheless vacated the denial of the mo-
tion to suppress, finding that the officer's suspicion, based "solely on
the single, brief straddling of the center line of the undivided high-
way,"85 was unreasonable. The lateness of the hour, although disre-
garded by the court, obviously did factor into the officer's decision
to stop the defendant because the officer testified that he "suspected
the operator to be [either] under the influence of [alcohol] or
asleep."86 Since it is unlikely that the officer would have believed
the defendant asleep if he had observed the defendant during the
daytime, the time of night logically played a role in the officer's de-
cision to stop the defendant. Whether or not it did, however, for
that particular officer is not determinative of the objective reasona-
bleness of the stop. The court should have considered time as a ma-
terial surrounding circumstance in determining objective
reasonableness of suspicion regardless of whether it played any role
in the officer's own actual suspicion. Caron serves to illustrate the
inconsistency in Maine's approach to using the doctrine of totality of
the circumstances in determining the reasonableness of an officer's
suspicion.
In State v. Kneeland' the Law Court majority failed, as in Nelson
and Caron, to consider all the surrounding circumstances. In Knee-
land the investigating officer testified that in the early morning
hours he had been told by a second officer that the defendant's vehi-
cle had backed into a snow bank and made a wide turn in driving
out of a parking lot. The testifying officer stopped the vehicle after
he observed it crossing the center line and operating at low speed."8
The motion judge, however, noted that "the most damaging evi-
dence would be backing into a snow bank across the parking lot."89
The Law Court held that because the comments made by the motion
judge were "incomplete and unfocused"' and did not "present a
82. Id (emphasis added).
83. Id (emphasis added).
84. 534 A.2d 978 (Me. 1987).
85. Id at 979 (emphasis added).
86. Id (emphasis added).
87. 552 A.2d 4 (Me. 1988).
88. Id at 5.
89. Id
90. Id at 6.
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clear statement of the basis for the trial court's decision,"9 the
state's appeal necessarily must fail.
In his Kneeland dissent Justice Wathen took issue with the major-
ity's failure to consider all the circumstances presented. He noted
that the officer "testified to other significant factors which, when
taken together, clearly give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity." 9 Two of the significant factors cited by Justice Wathen
were the fact that it was 2:00 A.M. and that it was New Year's morn-
ing. Ironically, Justice Wathen concurred in both the Caron and
Nelson opinions, where time of night (and the fact that it was Christ-
mas Eve in Nelson) was overlooked by the court.93
B. Maine Cases that Give Insufficient Weight to Totality of
Circumstances Stray from the Cortez Standard
Nelson departs from the reasonable suspicion doctrine articulated
in the Supreme Court's analysis in United States v. Cortez.94 While
the Maine Law Court in numerous decisions95 makes reference to
the totality of the circumstances doctrine for determining objective
suspicion, in Nelson adherence to the concept gives way to formality
of words.
In fact, fhae Nelson court focuses solely on Officer Holmes's obser-
vation of Nelson "drinkin' a can of beer."96 With the exception of a
brief reference to time and date in the court's initial statement of
facts related by the officer, the court lends no weight to these factors
in determining the objective reasonableness of the officer's stop of
Nelson.
Although the court refers to the "totality of the circumstances"
and the "whole picture" three times in its one-page analysis of the
case,97 in its decision it never considers the surrounding circum-
stances of time and date. The court's failure to address time and
date results from the court confusing the two different sources of
91. Id. (quoting Conger v. Conger, 304 A.2d 426, 429 (Me. 1973)).
92. State v. Kneeland, 552 A.2d 4, 6-8 (Me. 1988) (,Vathen, J., dissenting).
93. The conclusion that the Nelson court overlooked the surrounding circum-
stances is bolstered by Justice Glassman's dissent in State v. Dean, 645 A.2d 634,
636-37 (Me. 1994) (Glassman, J., dissenting). In Dean the defendant parked late
one night in an uninhabited housing development where recent complaints of van-
dalism had been reported. In an attempt to distinguish Nelson from Dean, Justice
Glassman reasoned that while the Dean case turned on the site of the stop, Nelson
"turned on whether merely drinking a can of beer in a parked car provided a reason-
ably articulable suspicion that a crime had taken place." State v. Dean, 645 A.2d at
637, n.1 (Glassman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
94. 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (holding that when determining what cause is suffi-
cient to authorize a police stop, a court must take into account "the totality of cir-
cumstances-the whole picture").
95. See supra note 65.
96. Id. at 722.
97. Id.
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evidence against which to apply its subjective and objective stan-
dards for reasonable suspicion: the officer's actual suspicion versus
the totality of the circumstances as addressed by a trained officer.9"
In addition to stressing the importance of a court's consideration
of the totality of the circumstances, the Cortez Court emphasized
that a court must assess the facts and circumstances of the stop "as
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement." 99 In
failing to give adequate consideration to the circumstances of time
and date, the Nelson court thus was unable to consider inferences
that would be drawn from that time and date by a trained officer.
In his treatise on the Fourth Amendment, Professor Wayne
LaFave notes, "There are several other factors, none of which indi-
vidually would justify a stopping for investigation, which nonethe-
less are properly considered together with other suspicious
circumstances in determining whether there are grounds for such a
brief seizure. One is the time of day."' 0 Professor LaFave quotes
an empirical study:
Most field interrogations are conducted at night. The later
the hour, the more likely it is that a person observed will be
stopped for interrogation. Officers apparently feel that the
risk of error is much greater during daylight hours, when, as
one officer put it, there are many "legitimate" persons on the
streets. The widely held attitude of patrol officers is that per-
sons found on the streets late at night are more likely to be
guilty of some criminal offense; "decent" people are in bed,
and those remaining on the streets without clear indications of
legitimate business are "up to no good."''1 1
By ignoring the date and the time of night in Nelson, the Law Court
failed to recognize both important circumstances of the stop and the
inferences that reasonably would have been drawn from them by
Officer Holmes.
98. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18.
99. Id at 418.
100. LAFAVE, supra note 14, § 9.3(c) at 454. It is interesting to note that in a
LExis search of approximately 75 Maine cases in which a defendant was charged
with operating under the influence of alcohol and subsequently moved to suppress
the evidence, well over one-half of the arrests occurred after dark and over one-
third occurred after midnight. Only two of those stops occurred in the daytime. The
remaining cases failed to mention the time of the stop; some of these cases were
decided on issues of law and thus the discussion of facts was limited, and others of
these cases were memorandum opinions. While these statistics are not dispositive
on the issue of the reasonableness of the officer's suspicion in Nelson, they tend to
support the proposition that experienced police officers are well aware that drivers
are much more likely to be intoxicated at night.
101. Id (quoting LAWRENCE P. TniFANY ET AL., DETECMON OF CRIME 21
(1967)).
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C. The Nelson Decision Follows Caron's Misguided Lead
Because the Nelson court failed to give adequate weight to certain
circumstances that, when viewed objectively from the point of view
of a trained officer, would have justified the investigating officer's
reasonable suspicion to make a stop, the decision necessarily de-
parts from United States Supreme Court precedent in Cortez. In an
attempt to identify the precise ways in which the Nelson decision
differs from the Supreme Court's approach in Cortez, it is instruc-
tive to look again, in more detail, at the Law Court's opinion in State
v. Caron.1 02
In Caron the investigating officer stopped the operator of a motor
vehicle after observing the vehicle straddle the center line of the
road for twenty-five to fifty yards. There was neither oncoming traf-
fic nor any other erratic or unusual driver behavior. The stop led to
Caron's arrest for operating under the influence of intoxicating li-
quor. In vacating the judgment of conviction, the Caron court noted
that the officer's suspicion that Caron was driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol
was based solely on the single, brief straddling of the center
line of the undivided highway, with no oncoming traffic in
sight and no vehicles passing on the left, not constituting a vio-
lation of any traffic law. The observation, even when taken
with all rational inferences that can be drawn from it,103 did
not give rise to an objectively reasonable suspicion that crimi-
nal activity was involved."°
In a critical analysis of the Caron decision, Maine District Court
Judge Sheldon'05 states his reading of the case as follows: "[L]ots of
people drive in the center of the road at least momentarily for lots
of reasons, many of which are legitimate, and few of which derive
from the unsafe condition of the driver or of the vehicle; therefore,
stopping a car for one such aberration is unjustifiable."' 6 If Judge
Sheldon's interpretation of the court's holding is correct, then the
Caron court, in saying that the officer did not have enough cause to
stop Caron's vehicle, may have been articulating a "reasonable
cause," rather than a reasonable suspicion, standard.1' A "reason-
able cause" standard is highly objective; it does not consider infer-
102. 534 A.2d 978 (Me. 1987). See supra text accompanying note 84.
103. The Caron decision differs in this respect from the Nelson opinion: the Nel-
son court made no indication that it even considered the officer's rational inferences.
104. State v. Caron, 534 A.2d at 979.
105. The Honorable John C. Sheldon assumed Maine's District Court bench on
December 21, 1987, and was "pelted immediately with suppression motions engen-
dered by the still fresh decision in State v. Caron." The experience led Judge Shel-
don to prepare a critique of Caron and its precedential limitations. See Hon. John C.
Sheldon, Vehicular Stops and the Maine Constitution, 3 ME. B. J. 182 (1988).
106. Id. at 184.
107. Id.
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ences a trained officer would make. Rather, only observable
circumstances of the stop are judged by the court to determine
whether enough evidence exists to amount to "cause." As Judge
Sheldon notes:
Not once did the Law Court mention the combined facts of
the day and time of the stop; all the Court talked about was
the operation of the vehicle. Not once, therefore, did the
Court discuss whether the officer, on that day and at that time,
should have read more into the operation of the vehicle than
he might have on a Sunday at noon. I doubt that the Court
merely overlooked important facts; I wonder, however, why
the Court-at least in its published opinion-overlooked im-
portant experience. To all appearances, the Court was pre-
pared to ignore the officer's tutored suspicion in favor of its
own, antiseptic view of things. This is why many attorneys ar-
gue that Caron represents a reasonable cause standard: the
Court apparently did ignore police suspicion.'0 8
The Supreme Court's "reasonable suspicion" test, as articulated in
Terry v. Ohio'0 9 and Delaware v. Prouse,110 is preferable to a "rea-
sonable cause" standard because the reasonable suspicion standard
also "relies upon the rich background of police experience to deter-
mine what is reasonable in any particular case.""'
108. Id. at 185 (footnote omitted). It is important to distinguish between the role
of "a trained officer's" inferences in the determination of objective suspicion (which
are necessary for "reasonable suspicion" but ignored under a reasonable cause stan-
dard) and any inferences drawn by the particular investigating officer (which apply
only to Maine's subjective suspicion requirement for reasonable suspicion).
109. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
110. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
111. Sheldon, supra note 105, at 184. Judge Sheldon, in his discussion of how the
Caron decision strays from United States Supreme Court precedent, notes that the
Caron Law Court
may, by default of support in the federal constitution, have created its own
exclusionary rule under the Maine Constitution. This is unlikely to have
been the court's intention .... [I]n citing the federal and state constitu-
tions as authority for its holding, the Law Court mentioned them in con-
junction, so the Court must have assumed that the same exclusionary rule
applied to both.
Id. at 183 (footnote omitted).
In favor of the argument that the Law Court has not attempted to create its own
exclusionary rule separate from that of the United States Supreme Court, the Nelson
decision likewise cites both the Maine and federal constitutions (as well as Supreme
Court case law). In addition, the Law Court previously has said that it is "unneces-
sary to decide the issue whether there is a separate exclusionary rule under article I,
section 5 [sic] of the Maine Constitution." State v. Marquis, 525 A.2d 1041, 1043
(Me.1987).
In support of the position that Maine may be on the path to creating its own
exclusionary rule, however, is the lack of a citation to a federal authority in its recent
decision of State v. Cusack, 649 A.2d 16 (Me. 1994), in which the Law Court refers
only to Maine case law and Article I, Section 5 of the Maine Constitution, not to the
United States Constitution.
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The Nelson court seems either to have applied a Caron "reason-
able cause" standard to determine the lawfulness of the officer's
stop or to have limited its determination of objective suspicion to
the subjective grounds articulated by the officer, ignoring the total-
ity of circumstances and all the inferences a trained officer would
draw from them. The state was obligated to prove "enough suspi-
cion" rather than mere "nonarbitrariness."12 Applying Judge Shel-
don's analysis of Caron to the Nelson case, a legitimate reading of
the holding might be the following: many people consume an alco-
holic beverage while in a parked car, few instances of which lead to
the unsafe operation of a motor vehicle; therefore, stopping a car
upon viewing such an occurrence is unjustifiable. Either Nelson
reveals a court inconsistently applying its own "reasonable suspi-
cion" standard for a police stop or it suggests a court relying upon a
"reasonable cause" standard whose implications would alter signifi-
cantly the basis for determining the propriety of an officer's actions
in investigatory stops.113
V. CONCLUSION
The Nelson decision illustrates the difficulties the Law Court en-
counters in the application of both its subjective and objective stan-
dards to the determination of reasonable suspicion under
constitutional constraints. By judging an officer's reasonable suspi-
cion against two separate standards, the Maine Law Court may
tend, as it did in Nelson, to lose sight of the requirement that it view
the totality of the circumstances in assessing the objective reasona-
bleness of an officer's suspicion. The Law Court instead, as argua-
bly occurred in Nelson, may limit its assessment to circumstances
stated by the investigating officer as reasons for his stop. If the
Maine Law Court is to continue to adhere to a subjective test, use of
the officer's testimony should be limited to the determination of his
suspicion and must not be used as the sole criteria for circumstances
defining the objective reasonableness of the stop.
While a purely subjective standard would contravene the Supreme
Court's objective standard for "reasonable suspicion," a "reasonable
cause" absolutist standard, arguably applied by the Nelson court, is
unworkable in its lack of consideration of the inferences and deduc-
tions made by a trained officer. Consistent adherence to the objec-
tive totality of the circumstances doctrine, evaluated in light of a
112. Judge Sheldon notes that "on a motion to suppress, the State's burden is
supposed to be to prove a negative-nonarbitrariness-rather than a positive-
enough suspicion." Sheldon, supra note 105, at 183 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648 (1979) (emphasis added)).
113. Id. at 184. Judge Sheldon believes that the adoption of a "reasonable cause"
standard would lead to factoring police suspicion out of traffic-stop suppression
cases. Id. at 185.
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trained officer's experience, would put an end to the inconsistencies
which have led to the absence of clear guidance in the area of inves-
tigatory stops in Maine.
Sandra Denison Shannon
